Abstract: Experimental philosophy is comprised of two broad projects, the negative project and the positive project, each of which is a response to a kind of armchair use of intuitions. I examine two examples of the negative projectthe analysis of knowledge and the theory of referenceand two examples of the positive projectfree will and intentional actionand review criticisms of each example. I show how the criticisms can be met and argue that even if they could not have been met, experimental philosophy raises important questions about methodology, opening the door on new questions and new ways of looking at old questions. For that reason, experimental philosophy as a movement is robust and full of potential.
Introduction
The recent naturalistic movement known as experimental philosophy has become established enough now that to speak simply of`experimental philosophy' is to use a convenient label that describes very diverse projects unied by family resemblance around empirical methods. To outline all of the projects and subprojects and address not only the goals but also the criticisms would be far too ambitious for one paper. Nonetheless, it is possible to give the basic contours of two relatively exhaustive projects within experimental philosophy, and that is my undertaking in this paper.
But rst, to understand experimental philosophy, it is helpful to step back a little and examine empirical philosophy more generally, to see the genus to which it belongs. There are many ways that philosophy can intersect with the empirical. By`empirical philosophy' I have in mind something more specic. In empirical philosophy, a philosopher uses a scientic nding or body of scientic ndings in order to advance a philosophical argument (for further discussion about the relationship between empirical/experimental philosophy and armchair conceptual analysis see Prinz 2008 ). An exemplar here is John Doris's work Lack of Character (2002) . Doris marshals an impressive array of social psychological research on personality and the correspondence bias and nds patterns in it.
Namely, he nds that there is massive amounts of empirical evidence for the fact that thinking we have a stable character is really a form of the correspondence bias. He argues for a version of situationism, the view that behavior is much more a function of situation or circumstance than character, that character is to a large extent a philosophical ction.
None of the experimental hypotheses he cites say,`the Aristotelian tradition is wrong' or`situationism is true'. How could they? That is not a claim that can be directly tested empirically using a controlled study. Doris's contribution is to critically examine the broad trend and show its philosophical import. He also weighs in on debates in the literature about the existence of personality, but again contributes philosophically by showing how these debates matter for the philosophical question of whether there is such a thing as character and how the answer matters for ethics. Doris's work is an exemplar: empirical philosophy also includes much of the literature on mental imagery, emotion, perception and mental representation, to name just a few examples. The characteristic that makes these works empirical philosophy is the use of empirical evidence. The use of empirical evidence in all of these topics inuences the kinds of questions asked and changes what counts as a relevant way to look at a question. For example, contemporary virtue theorists have heard of Milgram's famous experiments (1974) . Doris's contribution is to argue that the experiment and others like it help undercut virtue theory. Also, belonging to empirical philosophy is a matter of degree, and empirical philosophy does not use empirical science as its only tool: it participates in both elements of its moniker.
Empirical philosophy becomes experimental philosophy when the philosopher carries out the experiments needed. Philosophers have turned to carrying out their own experiments because empirical philosophical questions are not conned to the kinds of things that scientists typically work on. Primarily, there are empirical claims made in the philosophical literature that require empirical backing. These empirical claims typically involve claims about intuitions but they are traditionally made from the armchair. There are two overlapping purposes for armchair intuitions. First, they are used as evidence for a theory. An armchair philosopher may say, for example`it is intuitive that x' or`the folk intuitively think that y'. The goal in saying this is to bolster a particular claim.
A causal theorist about names may claim that it is intuitive to think that in a particular situation a name refers to someone who does not t any of the descriptions associated with the person. An epistemologist may claim that it is intuitive that a particular case of justied true belief is not knowledge. In each caseand examples abound in the literaturethe appeal to intuition is supposed to give evidence for the theory in question. Second, claims about intuitions take place when a philosophical project is supposed to track folk concepts. For example, consider the free will literature. Philosophers repeatedly claim that although there may be many concepts of free will, the one they are interested in is the one that the folk use in ordinary practices, the concept that supports ordinary claims about moral responsibility. Claims about whether the folk are intuitively compatibilists or intuitively incompatibilists are made from the armchair. Folk psychology provides another example. In discussions about folk psychology, ordinary concepts like beliefs, desires, and intentions are precisely the target of investigation. Hence, the question of whether folk psychology requires an intentional action to involve trying on the part of the agent targets the folk concept.
Armchair philosophers use intuitions about cases to declare what the folk concept is.
The two broad projects alluded to above can be understood as a response to each of these types of armchair use of intuition. First, when armchair philosophers use a claim about what is intuitive to bolster a particular theory, various empirically related concerns arise. For whom is the claim intuitive? Are our intuitions cognitively respectable or are they subject to bias? Are they neutral or shaped by philosophically irrelevant considerations? In the negative project, or experimental restrictivism, experimental philosophers have discovered great diversity in intuition and cognitive bias on the part of armchair philosophers, and have therefore seriously undermined the method of using intuitions as evidence for the application of a concept.
Second, when armchair philosophers claim to be discussing folk concept as in the cases of moral responsibility and folk psychology, the experimental philoso- argue that because of the contributions the negative project makes, even a very critical stance toward the negative project shows that it is here to stay because of the important avenues and dimensions it opens.
In sections 34, I explain the positive project through two more examples.
Discussions of free will and of folk psychology have relied on claims about folk concepts. Experimental philosophy has shown that folk concepts are more subtle and dierent than philosophers may have supposed. Unlike the negative project, the positive project does not call for an end to using intuitions. In fact, in these debates, intuitions are what we seek to understand, so it would be rather incoherent to eliminate them from the discussion. The positive program only says that claims about what the folk intuit are empirical claims. Criticisms of the positive project argue that the experiments do not show what they claim to show and criticize more broadly the method of using experiments to understand folk intuitions. I argue on the contrary that the experiments do get at the philosophically important concepts, but even if they didn't, the positive project would be here to stay because it helps us better understand how our minds work and human nature more generally.
1. The Negative Project and the Analysis of Knowledge Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) Not surprisingly, such accounts have been given, and they point to objections to the negative project generally. Some of them contain empirical claims. Experimental philosophers must take empirical claims seriously as their relevance is the cornerstone of experimental philosophy. Here I discuss the most prominent objection, which has come to be known as the Reection Defense (see e.g., Sosa
2005; Kauppinen 2007; Sosa 2007).
The basic idea behind the Reection Defense is that the intuitions of philosophers are the only ones that matter. After all, philosophers are being careful, thoughtful, and deliberate when they intuit. College students lling out a survey presumably are anything but careful, thoughtful, and deliberate. They are simply recording gut reactions, not reective reactions.
The objection that unreective intuitions are irrelevant rests on an empirical claim. Weinberg, Alexander and Gonnerman put the point succinctly:
The Reection Defense turns on an empirical hypothesis: intuitions of interest to philosophersthat is, thoughtful judgments based on reection on the casewon't suer from the same kinds of instability that seem to aict the intuitions studied by experimental philosophers. (forthcoming)
They test the empirical hypothesis in the following ingenious manner. They look at a personality trait known as Need for Cognition (NFC). This trait measures the degree to which a person engages in and enjoys thinking (Cacioppo/Petty 1982) . The objection is hence operationalized by WAG to say that high NFC subjects will exhibit less instability than mid or low NFC subjects. The hypothesis is then tested.
First, WAG nd that mid and low NFC subjects are susceptible to priming.
These results replicate SWA's results. For high NFC subjects, the situation is more complex. They are also susceptible to priming, but in the reverse direction.
That is, high NFC subjects seem to overcompensate for the default position.
Nonetheless, priming eects are priming eects, and the empirical claim comes out against the reection defense.
The NFC defense is very powerful, although questions can still be raised. Is the reectiveness that philosophers display suciently captured by the need for cognition instrument? Perhaps, after all, philosophical reectiveness is shaped and ne tuned by years of considering the nuances of arguments, seeing how they t into a larger debate, teasing out the implications, nding consistency with other views and so on. One hardly expects, that is, that Keith Lehrer would change his mind about the Truetemp case if he read about some poor example of knowledge presented as pseudo-scientic research in his morning newspaper. Also, one might ask whether NFC is a true personality trait or whether NFC is subject to situationist considerations. Finally one might argue that this overcompensation that philosophers do produces more stable intuitions.
That is, much like Descartes used a worst-case scenario to show that knowledge is possible, high NFC subjects/philosophers do the same, so the instability actually produces more rigorous standards. Challenges to the NFC defense are, that is, possible, but this does not change the fact that the burden of proof is on the philosopher who uses intuitions to show why they can count as evidence: we cannot assume that intuitions are evidence uncritically any more. Moreover, there is strong evidence that such an account will not be forthcoming and that the entire armchair project will be hence undermined.
By making the question about intuitiveness empirical and by making the objection empirical as well, experimental philosophy gives rise to new avenues for research, as indicated by the questions in the previous paragraph. When it comes to perspectives, more is better. Even someone who disagrees with Doris's situationism has to agree that it raises philosophically important questions in a way that inherently relies on the empirical. So even though prima facie experimental restrictivism may seem to represent only a narrowing of philosophy, it also represents a broadening. That is, the fear that experimental philosophy will bring about the end of philosophy is unfounded. Because of the way it broadens the eld, experimental philosophy is here to stay.
The Negative Project and Theories of Reference
The second example of the negative project comes from a pair of papers about the theory of reference. Mallon, Machery, Nichols and Stich (MlMNS) argue rst of all that philosophers use what they call the method of cases when trying to nd the correct theory of cases. The method of cases is that the correct theory of reference for a class of terms T is the theory which is best supported by the intuitions competent users of T have about the reference of members of T across actual and possible cases (2009, 338) . In other words, the theory of reference is in a similar situation as the analysis of knowledge: each debate relies on intuitions to give evidence.
Like the analysis of knowledge, the theory of reference would also suer from a serious methodological predicament if the intuitions about the reference of proper names (to take a very central case) turn out to be contingent upon nonphilosophically relevant factors. Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich (McMNS) argue in Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style, that linguistic intuitions are in fact signicantly dierent based again on whether the subject is Western or East Asian.
They use probes similar to Kripke's famous Gödel case, the case that elicits the intuition among philosophers that the name Gödel would refer to the historical Gödel even if none of the descriptions that common belief attaches to him are accurate. Western subjects have intuitions that t Kripke's causal-historical account; East Asian subjects intuit signicantly more like descriptivists (2004).
Again, work in cultural psychology provides a possible way of understanding these dierences: Western subjects tend to use a causal orientation when describing the world whereas East Asian subjects lean more toward perceiving similarity (Nisbett 2003 
The Positive Pro ject and Free Will
The common assumption in the literature on free will is that the kind of free will that matters is the one that is commonly said to underwrite ordinary attributions of moral responsibility. The reason that that kind is in play while others are not is that the goal is to explain ordinary attributions of moral responsibility or show that those attributions are unjustied. So the sense of free will in question is the one that supports moral responsibility. Some compatibilists say our ordinary practices may even turn out to constitute the concept of free will (e.g., Watson
1987; Strawson 2008). Many incompatibilists are at pains to show that a lack
of free will would still leave practices like criminal punishment with sucient justication (e.g., Pereboom 2001). A technical concept that is divorced from the ordinary practices is undesirable, as that would then not be the problem of free will, the one that is so central and so vexing. An analysis of the doctrine of physicalism does not have to conform to ordinary notions or practices in the way that an analysis of free will does: the question of physicalism does not get its import from such a direct tie to our ethical lives.
From the outset, we can note that since these discussions target the ordinary concept of free will and moral responsibility, the experimental philosopher who examines folk intuitions is uniquely protected from the Reection Defense. It is worth reiterating here that experimental philosophy is really a class of dierent projects: objections to one project do not undermine the entire enterprise (for a similar argument, see Nadelhoer/Nahmias 2007). The idea here is not to give an analysis of free will, a set of necessary and sucient conditions by coming up with something that conforms to every set of thought experiments. Rather the idea is to develop an understanding of free will grounded in practices of ascribing moral responsibility that shows whether or not it is compatible with determinism.
Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoer and Turner examine folk intuitions about compatibilsm and incompatibilism both as an object of interest in their own right and to support, albeit indirectly, compatibilism, to strengthen the compatibilists's rhetorical position (2006) . Incompatibilism is more metaphysically demanding, they contend, since it requires a libertarian conception of free will if determinism is true. Moreover, they hold, metaphysical demand should be on a need only basis. Since incompatibilism is more metaphysically demanding, there support for it is weakened unless it is the intuitive notion. Hence, if incompatibilism is not intuitive, compatiblism, although not resolved, does carry a large advantage.
They examine whether incompatibilism is the intuitive view through a series of experiments. Subjects are presented with a determinist universe (although not in those terms exactly since determinism is often taken to be the opposite of free will) and asked whether an agent in that universe is free or morally responsible.
They found that the majority of people do think that the agent is free and responsible, regardless of whether the action is negative, positive, or neutral, and independently of various ways that determinism may be described.
To the extent that these results are denitive, philosophers who claim that incompatibilism is intuitive should be concerned. After all, if it is undesirable to assert irrelevant falsehoods it is even less desirable to assert falsehoods that carry argumentative weight. So NMNT show the importance of whether incompatibilism is intuitive along with giving preliminary evidence that it isn't. To test this, they designed a study that postulates that there is a deterministic universe, one they call Universe A. They assigned subjects to one of two conditions in order to compare levels of compatibilist vs. incompatibilist responses. In the concrete condition, subjects answered the question following this scenario (111):
In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he decides that the only way to be with her is to kill his wife and three children. He knows that it is impossible to escape from his house in the event of a re. Before he leaves on a business trip, he sets up a device in his basement that burns down the house and kills his family. Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?
YES NO
In the abstract condition, subjects answered this:
In Universe A, is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions?
Again, their concern is to see if these two questions bring out a dierence in intuitions. They found very strong evidence that it does: in the concrete condition, 72% gave the compatibilist response; in the abstract condition, 86% gave the incompatibilist response (111). The folk are not simply compatibilists, as other experiments seem to indicate.
At this point, it may be tempting for the non-experimentally minded philo- Teasing out which model is best is a complicated aair. To give evidence, NK look at another experiment. Specically, they ask whether concreteness fully explains the compatibilist responses or whether aect is the driving force by holding the concreteness the same in both cases and only changing the level of aect. Subjects in this experiment consider again Universe A, but are asked one of the following: As he has done many times in the past, Bill stalks and rapes a stranger. Is it possible that Bill is fully morally responsible for raping the stranger? As he has done many times in the past, Mark arranges to cheat on his taxes. Is it possible that Mark is fully morally responsible for cheating on his taxes? The results are striking: 64% hold Bill responsible, while only 23%
hold Mark responsible (117).
Since aect clearly plays a role, the question is whether it generates a competence or an error. They argue that the experiments support the performance error (or hybrid) model best. The performance error model makes better sense of the dierent responses when subjects consider Universe A vs. an indeterministic universe. 89% of subjects hold Mark responsible in the indeterminist universe versus the 23% in the determinist universe. 95% consider Bill morally responsible in the indeterminist universe, but in the determinist universe, the drop to 64% is nowhere near as dramatic. This provides evidence for saying that subjects are responsive to the dierence between a determinst and indeterminst universe except when their aect skews their understanding (118).
So NK take this as preliminary evidence for the performance error model.
They argue that this issue is not decided just by their experiment and is not the kind of question that can be resolved by one experiment alone (118). But they have shown that both compatibilism and incompatibilism appeal to an element of our psychological makeup (119). Plus, they have successfully argued that we can no longer declare simpliciter that people are natural compatibilists: those who think that compatibilist intuitions should be given more weight need to give arguments as to why. Similarly, those who say we are natural incompatibilists need to explain why the compatibilist intuitions are not relevant to that claim.
Finally, I would argue that this type of investigation opens up ways of looking at successor views to hard determinism (Double 1991; Strawson 1994 ; e.g. cal debate about the concept of`newness' arises from this debate. Discussions of free will are dierent, because at the end of the day we still need to decide whether someone was morally responsible. If I steal your pen and you blame me, it isn't going to go very far for me to point out that our dispute is verbal. This is not to say that it is impossible for there to be multiple senses of terms, or to say that people can't make mistakes, or to say that it is impossible to have a merely verbal dispute about whether someone is morally responsible.
For such a confusion to have been the case in the NK survey, though, it would have to be likely that we could get someone together who said Bill is morally responsible with someone who said Mark is not and for them to say`oh, we aren't really arguing about whether someone can be responsible in universe A'.
It is an empirical question as to whether the folk would assent to that, and I do not have evidence, but I think it is highly implausible that it would happen. It seems highly implausible that people switch senses of moral responsibility when they switch from abstract to concrete descriptions of the same action. Hence I do think it is very unlikely for something so central and deep to be a matter of merely verbal disputes. NK have found a tension in a concept that is central and deep, so it seems implausible that the disputes they have uncovered could be merely verbal.
The Positive Pro ject and Intentional Action
Folk psychology forms the basis for much reection in the philosophy of mind.
Folk psychology is the way that people attribute beliefs, desires, intentions and other psychological concepts to themselves and to others in order to make their way about in the world, specically to explain and predict behavior. Knobe found vastly dierent intuitions depending on whether the moral component is positive or negative. In the harm scenario, 82% of subjects said the chairman harmed the environment intentionally, while in the help scenario, only 23% said he helped the environment intentionally (131). The key result is that people seem to be considerably more willing to say that the agent brought about the side eect intentionally when they regard that side eect as bad than when they regard the side eect as good (133). The result that moral considerations play a role in our attribution of intentionality is supported by much other work in philosophy and psychology.
Like NK, Knobe here wants not only to describe patterns of intuitions, but also to use those patterns to better understand how the mind works. He asks what explains the eect he found: is it that our folk concept really is morally laden, or should we rather say that it is not but that somehow moral considerations intervene. He considers and rejects three models of how the latter option would come into play, bolstering his claim that the moral considerations play a key role in our folk psychological concept of intentional actions. One nal model, proposed by Nadelhoer (2004) and by Malle and Nelson (2003) , says that the eect is a result of the eect of blame. Specically, people erroneously assign blame before they decide whether an action was intentional.
This would explain the data, but Knobe says, another more reasonable model also explains the data. This model says that people's judgment that the behavior itself is bad can inuence their intuitions as to whether the behavior was performed intentionally and that these intuitions can, in turn, play an important role in the process by which people determine whether or not to assign blame (139). Knobe shows this by proposing another experiment, since both of these models make the same prediction with regard to the previous experiment. This experiment presents a case where the side eect is bad but the agent is not blameworthy. Here, the chairman of the board decides to implement a program that will greatly increase sales in Massachusetts but decrease sales in New Jersey.
Even though there is a sense in which decreasing sales in New Jersey is bad, the chairman isn't thought to be blameworthy for doing it: after all, she deserves praise for increasing sales overall. Knobe found that in this case as well, people say that she intentionally decreased sales in New Jersey. Hence Knobe argues, his model better ts the patterns of responses in the data. Knobe urges that it is better to revise our understanding of folk psychology and acknowledge that the concept of intentional action is not simply a tool for predicting and explaining behavior.
In more recent work, Knobe uses not only these results but a vast array of other similar results about moral terms such as but also even concepts like causation to argue that moral considerations are key to our competencies regarding all of these terms, that we should think of people as moralists when they display he would ask how that is consistent with the belief that the other executive did not intentionally help the environment. Only in this way would he uncover whether people robustly believe that there is an asymmetry. It may turn out that most people will decide that their answer that the CEO intentionally harmed the environment was the result of being distracted by the harm done, that once they realize that they were inuenced incorrectly by thinking about hurt animals or the like, they will come to say that the CEO did not intentionally harm the environment.
Clearly, the Knobe eect would be highly suspect if Knobe's experiments did not elicit genuine folk intuitions. But is Kauppinen operating with the same understanding of a folk intuition as the experimental philosopher? For Kauppinen, folk concepts cannot be derived from what people say in response to survey questions because the conditions are not ideal. However, experimental philosophy relies on manipulation checks and experimental philosophers administer the surveys in a way that minimizes subject fatigue and other performance errors (except when, of course, the idea is to see whether something like aect produces a performance error). For Kauppinen, these conditions still fall short, and only philosophical dialogue can remedy the situation. Kauppinen acknowledges that there is the possibility of introducing bias and recommends avoiding it. But since philosophical dialogue inherently introduces philosophical sophistication, by subjecting survey answers to scrutiny through dialogue, we are no longer getting at folk conceptions. We are deepening them, changing them, shaping them. Ordinary intuitions and philosophical beliefs dier in fundamental ways. The later are more sophisticated, consistent and rational. Even if the dialogue Kauppinen recommends does not involve introducing philosophical theories, it still involves introducing a philosophical style of reection. So in the course of the dialogue folk intuitions lose their folk character.
Moreover, the change that folk intuitions undergo during dialogue is likely to be temporary. That is, I believe that typically, people can and often do decide in the dialogue that Kauppinen suggests, that the CEO did not intentionally harm the environment, but then a few days or weeks or months later can and often do go on to attribute intention to action on the basis of moral considerations.
Mere reection does not overcome optical illusions; similarly, subjecting the folk to temporary dialogue is not likely to fundamentally, permanently change their folk intuitions.
Here are some examples that show the insuciency of conscious reection for shaping behavior. First, Bargh, Chen and Burrows show that subjects who perform a decoy task that involves many words associated with being elderly walk more slowly to the elevator after the experiment is supposedly over than subjects who do not read words associated with being elderly (1996) I therefore argue that at best the arguments against the negative project of experimental philosophy limit its scope or say that it shows something other than it thinks, but nonetheless in any case it always teaches us something important. Arguments against the positive project can be met by explaining the role that folk intuitions play in these debates. Hence, even if all experimental philosophy makes the mistakes the critics accuse it of making, it has forced the armchair philosophers to clarify their projects and it has opened new avenues of investigation, and that is why it is here to stay.
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